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defendants could only have given so much of the residue of the
conversation as tended to qualify that given in evidence by the
plaintiff, and no more; that is, they could have given all upon the
same subject. But there is no pretence that the plaintiff had
directly or indirectly called for any declarations of the defendants
concerning the agreement between them, and the conversation was
admitted under the offer to show "what defendants may have said
about plaintiff taking this claim."
The evidence was erroneously admitted, and we cannot say that
it did not influence the result.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted; costs
to abide result.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
In the Court of Queen's Bench, sitting in Blane after Hfilary
Term, 1861.'
LOUIS CASTRIQUE VS. SOLOMON LEVI BEHRENS AND OTHERS.
Declaration stated that the registered owner of a British ship mortgaged it, and on
the 9th of April, 1855, the plaintiff became the mortgagee; that on the 8th June,
1854, the captain, while on a voyage, drew a bill at Melbourne, in Australia, on
the owner in England, for necessary disbursements of the ship, in favor of
L. & Co.; that L. & Co., without value, indorsed it to the defendants, British
subjects residing in England; that the bill was dishonored; that the defendants,
knowing the premises, and that the ship was about to call on her voyage at the
port of Havre de Grace, in France, and that by the law of France the bonil fide
holder for value of such a bill (if a French subject) could take proceedings in the
French courts and attach and sell the ship, conspired with T., a French subject,
that they should indorse the bill to him without value, and that he should take
proceedings in the French courts, and falsely represent that he was bona, fide
holder of the bill for value; and thereupon T., upon the arrival of the ship in a
French port, took proceedings in the French courts, and therein obtained orders
for the attachment and sale of the ship; and the plaintiff was deprived of his
property in the ship: Held, that this being a judgment in rem, though in a
foreign court, an action could not be maintained while it remained unreversed,
as it was consistent with the averments in the declaration that the plaintiff had
notice of the proceedings in France, and allowed judgment to go by default, or
'7 Jurist N. S., 1028.
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even that he appeared in the French court, and the question whether T. was a
holder of the bill for value was decided against him.
The question in this case arose on demurrer to a declaration, the
substance of which is sufficiently stated in the preceding head note.
H~all, for the plaintiff.
A conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff, and deprive him of his pro-
perty, as in the declaration set forth, though carried out abroad, is
the subject of an action in the courts of this country. In Coxe vs.
Smithe, 1 Lev. 119, it was.held actionable to procure an officer of
the custom-house to be deprived of his office by means of a false
oath. In F. N. B., 116 D., it is said, "Conspiracy shall be main-
tainable against those who conspire to forge false deeds which are
given in evidence, by which any person's land is lost ;" and the pre-
cise mode of effecting the object by means of the fraud is immaterial
(Lord Campbell, in delivering the judgment of the court in Gerhard
vs. Bates, 2 El. & Bl. 476, 491; 17 Jur. 1097, 1100); and it is
immaterial whether the false representation which causes the damage
be made to the person himself or to another who has power to
deprive the person of his property. [He also cited Gregory vs. The
Duke of Brunswick, 6 Man. & G. 205; 7 Scott's N. R. 972.] As
to the objection that this is an action for an abuse of the process of
a foreign court, the first answer is, that the gist of the action is, that
there was a conspiracy in this country to deprive the plaintiff of his
property, by means of the two overt acts-the fraudulent indorse-
ment of the bill, and the false representation made to the court
abroad. Secondly, an action will lie for a conspiracy to abuse the
process of the courts in this country, for which redress might be
obtained otherwise than by action; la fortiori it will lie for an abuse
of the process in foreign courts, when the court does not know whe-
ther the party injured has any mode of obtaining redress in the
foreign country. [He cited Grainger vs. Hill, 4 Bing. N. 0. 212;
5 Scott, 561; -Heywood vs. Collinge, 9 Ad. & El. 268; Whitelegg
vs. Bichards, 2 B. & Cr. 45; Daniels vs. Fielding, 16 M. & W.
200; 10 Jur. 1061; and Farlie vs. Danks, 4 El. & El. 493; 1 Jur.
N. S. 331.] An action lies for a false affidavit, by which the pro-
cess of the court is put in motion. (Case of False Affidavits, 12 Rep,
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128.) [He also cited Willes, J., in Bevis vs. Smith, 18 C. B. 126,
142; 2 Jur. N. S. 614,616.] The rule, that the declaration should
show the termination of the proceedings which are the ground of
the action, is not applicable to a foreign judgment. The reason of
the rule is, that there might be inconsistent or incongruous judg-
ments on the records of the courts of this country. Further, this
court has no means of knowing that the plaintiff could take pro-
ceedings to set aside the judgment in the French court. Also, an
allegation that the termination of the proceedings was in favor of
the plaintiff is nbt required, where the action is for an abuse of the
]aw (Vaughan, J., in Grainger vs. Hill, 4 Bing. N. 0. 212, 223),
or where the proceedings were ex parte, because there is no oppor-
tunity of controverting them. Steward vs. qromett, 7 C. B., N. S.
191; 6 Jur. N. S. 776. It appears on the face of this declaration
that the plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings in the French
court. Thirdly, if this judgment was a judgment in rem,' it is not
conclusive, being shown to have been obtained by fraud. In The
.Duchess of Kingston's case, 2 Smith's L. C. 601, 633, 4th ed.,
speaking of a sentence of the ecclesiastical court, it is said, "But
if it was a direct and decisive sentence upon the point, and, as it
stands, to be admitted as conclusive evidence upon the point, and
not to be impeached from within, yet, like all other acts of the
highest judicial authority, it is impeachable from without. Although
it is not permitted to show that the court was mistaken, it may be
shown that they were misled." The declaration does not allege
that proceedings in rem were taken in France. " So it must appear
that there have been regular proceedings to found the judgment or
decree, and that the parties in-interest in rem have had notice or
an opportunity to appear and defend their interests, either per-
sonally or by their proper representatives, before it was pro-
nounced; for the common justice of all nations requires that no
condemnation should be pronounced before the party has an oppor-
tunity to be heard." (Story's Confl. Laws, s. 692, p. 987, 3d ed.)
1 See Cadtrique vs. Imrie, 8 C. B., N. S., 405, in which the Exchequer Chamber
held that the judgment was in rem, reversing the judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas, 8 C. B., N. S., 1; 6 Jur. N. S., 1058. See Cammel vs. ewell, in error, 5
H. & Norm., 728; 7 Jur. N. S., 918.
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It this action will not lie, there is no remedy for the plaintiff
against the defendants, who are English subjects resident in Eng-
land. No criminal proceedings could be taken in this country
against the defendants; they could not be charged as accessories
to the fraud of Troteux in France.
Montague Smith, (with whom was Tfatkln Williams,) contra.-
First, any abuse of the process of a foreign court, or any malprac-
tice in relation to proceedings in such court, affords no ground of
action in this country. An action will not lie against parties con-
spiring in England to do and to prosecute, and doing and prose-
cuting certain acts and proceedings in a foreign country, unless
the doing and prosecuting such acts and proceedings by such con-
spiracy is illegal or a cause of action in the foreign country, and
according to the law thereof. Assuming the proceeding in the court
of France to be a proceeding in rem, if it was a judgment in this
country this action would not lie. The proper course would be to
get it reversed, or to apply to the court to take it off the file of the
court. The sentence of a foreign Court of Admiralty, adjudging a
ship to be lawful prize, is conclusive. (Hfughes vs. Cornelius, 2
Show. 232, [see the special verdict set out in the note, p. 233,] S.
C., 2 Smith's L. C. 604:4th ed.) In note (Id. 614) it is said, "With
regard to these judgments in rem, . .. they, like all others, ....
are conclusive as to nothing which might have not been in question,
or was not material. The Attorney-General vs. King, 5 Price,
195." [WIGTMAN, J.-Which party is to show that the plaintiff
was summoned, or had notice of the proceedings?] It is not to be
presumed that the proper parties were not summoned, and that the
court in France would not cause a proper summons to be issued
before the property in the ship was sold and disposed of; and
therefore it is for the plaintiff to show that he was not summoned.
[WIGHTIMAN, J.-It may be a valid judgment in rem, though the
plaintiff knew nothing about it. As far as we know anything of
the proceedings in rem, there is no occasion for notice to the true
owner.] The declaration charges that the defendants conspired
with Troteux that he should falsely and fraudulently represent
that he was the bona fide holder of the bill for value. If that
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was not true, evidence might have been given to the contrary.
[He cited Hale, C. B., in Vanderbergh vs. Blake, Hardr. 194,195,
and Erle, 0. J., in Barber vs. Lesiter, 7 0. B., N. S. 175, 187,
188; 6 Jur. N. S. 654.] [Hall.-At the time when the ship was
attached the plaintiff had no notice, but before the ship was sold
the plaintiff- had notice. It is very doubtful whether the plaintiff
could have intervened to prevent the sale of the ship.] Before
an action can be brought for instituting proceedings, the proceed-
ings must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; Whitworth
vs. Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; and that principle is not impeached in
Steward vs. '-romett, 7 C. B., N. S. 191; 6 Jur. N. S. 776. If
the plaintiff is damnified to an extent for which he is not recom-
pensed by the judgment in his favor in France, this action might
lie for the excess. In Farlie vs. Danks, 4 El. & Bl. 493; 1 Jur.,
N. S., 331, the bankruptcy was superseded before action brought.
In Collins vs. Cave, 4 H. & Norm. 225; 5 Jur., N. S., 296, Pol-
lock, C. B., said, (p. 229,.) "If an action could be maintained for
maliciously suing, I do not know when litigation would end; the
next step would be an action for maliciously subpoenaing a wit-
ness ;" and Martin, B., added, "An action for maliciously suing
would involve a trial whether the judgment in the former action
was right ;" and as Hale, C. B., said in Vanderbergh vs. Blake,
(Hardr. 195,) "If such an action should be allowed, the judgment
would be blown off by a side-wind." [He also cited Jervis, C. J.,
in liaddan vs. Lott, 15 0. B. 411.] [WIGHTMAN, J.-In Smith
vs. Tonstall, Carth. 3, it was held that an action would lie where
the declaration charged that the defendant conspired with W. S.
to defeat the plaintiff in recovering rent in arrear from W. S., by
procuring W. S. falsely to confess a judgment to W. N., and that
W. N. sued out execution upon that feigned judgment, by virtue
whereof he seized the goods of W. S., and the plaintiff lost his
debt. And it is added, (p. 4,) that the defendant brought a writ
of error in Parliament, where the judgment was affirmed. And in
Saville vs. Boberts, 1 Salk. 13, it is said, (p. 14,) "And yet, if one
that is not concerned, as a stranger, procure another to sue me
causelessly, I may maintain against him generally," referring to
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F. N. B. 98, N. ; 2 Inst. 444; and 3 Cro. 378. In 1 Com. Dig.,,
by Hammond, "Action upon the Case for Conspiracy," 339, it is
said: "So it lies for procuring an action to be brought against
another maliciously," citing F. N. B., 116, E., and ;STinner vs.
Gunton, T. Raym. 176.] That is where special damage results.
(Marginal Note to Saville vs. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 880.) [WIGHT-
3MAN, J.-It is also said in Com. Dig., that an action lies if a man
"sue in the name of A. without his privity, though it be for a just
debt." And in Saville vs. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 880, "If a stranger
who is not concerned excites A. to sue an action against B., B. may
have an action against the stranger," citing F. N. B. 98, N., and
2 Inst. 444. All the authorities are collected in Cbtterill vs. Jones,
11 C. B. 713, in which it was held that case will not lie against
two persons for conspiring together maliciously and vexatiously,
and without reasonable or probable cause, to commence and com-
mencing an action against the plaintiff in the name of a third
person, but for their own benefit, without an allegation of legal
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.] This is not an action
for maliciously exciting persons who had no interest in the proceed-
ing; the defendants were holders of the bill. [WIGHTMAN, J.-
But they were holders without value.] Still the defendants might
be entitled to hold the proceeds against all the world. [WIGHT-
MAN, J.-In F. N. B., 98, H., it is said, "If an action of debt be
brought against two as executors, where one of them is not execu-
tor, if he who is not executor confess the action, he who is executor
shall have a deceit against him, and recover as much in damages."]
June 7.-foll, in reply.-A judgment in rem is not conclusive,
except upon the precise point decided. The plaintiff does not seek
to impeach the judgment of the Court in France as to the status of
the ship itself, nor as to the facts necessary to enable that Court to
arrive at its determination. [He cited Tayl. Bv., s. 1490, 3d ed.;
Lord .Ellenborough, in Fisher vs. Ogle, 1 Camp. 417, 418; and
Tindal, C. J., in -Dalgleish vs. Hodgson, 7 Bing. 495, 504.] It
was for the defendants to show that the plaintiff had an opportunity
of intervening before judgment was given; this Court cannot take
cognisance of proceedings of which they have no knowledge. Even
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if the plaintiff could take proceedings to set aside the judgment,
will the Court compel him to seek justice abroad ? Suppose war be-
tween this country and France. [COCKBURN, C. J.-That argu-
ment applies to any case. BLACKBURN, J.-Even when war is
raging between this country and another, this Court gives credit
to the judgment of the Admiralty Court of that country.] iHaddon
vs. Lott, 15 C. B. 411, and the cases in Cotterill vs. Jones, 11 C. B.
713, were decided on the ground that it was not shown that there
was any damage to the plaintiff, or that the damage naturally
flowed from the grievance charged in the declaration.
Cur. adv. valt.
Feb. 23.-CRoMPTO, J., delivered the judgment of the Court.-
In this case the demurrer to the declaration raises a question of
some difficulty.
There is no doubt, on principle and on the authorities, that an
action lies for maliciously, and without reasonable and probable
cause, setting the law of this country in motion to the damage of the
plaintiff, though not for a mere conspiracy to do so without actual
legal damage. (Cotterill vs. Jones, 11 C. B. 713; Barber vs. Lesiter,
7 C. B., N. S., 175; 6 Jur., N. S., 654.) But in such an action it
is essential to show that the proceeding, alleged to be instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, has terminated in favor of
the plaintiff, if from its nature it be capable of such a termination.
The reason seems to be, that if, in the proceeding complained of,
the decision was against the plaintiff, and was still unreversed, it
would not be consistent with the principles on which law is admin-
istered, for another Court, not being a Court of appeal, to hold that
the decision was come to without reasonable and probable cause.
In the present case, the proceedings were not instituted in the
courts of this country, but they are stated to be proceedings in rem
in the Courts of France. There is no direct authority on the
point, but it seems to us that the same principle, which makes it
objectionable to entertain a suit grounded on the assumption that
the unreserved decision of a Court in this country was come to
without reasonable and probable cause, applies where the judgment,
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though in a foreign country, is one of a Court of competent jurisdic-
tion, and come to under such circumstances as to be binding in this
country. A judgment in rem is, as a general rule, conclusive every-
where and on every one, and we do not think that the averments in
the declaration show that this judgment, in rem was obtained under
such .circumstances as to be impeachable by the present plaintiff.
It is averred, and we must on the demurrer assume that it is truly
averred, that by the law of France the judgment in rem can only
be obtained if the holder of the bill of exchange be a French sub-
ject, and bona fide holds for value; and we must take it as admitted
on this demurrer, that Troteux, the French holder of the bill of
exchange, by the fraudulent procurement of the defendants, falsely
represented to the French Courts that he was holder for value when
he was not.
It is not necessary to say what would be the effect if it were
stated that, by the contrivance of the defendants, the proceedings
were such that the plaintiff had no opportunity to appear in the
French Court and dispute the allegation. In the present case it is
quite consistent with the averments in the declaration, that the
plaintiff had notice of the proceedings in France, and purposely
allowed judgment to go by default, or-even that he appeared in the
French Court, intervened, and was heard, and that the very ques-
tion whether Troteux was a holder for value, was there decided
against him.
We think, on the principle laid down in The Bank of Austral-
asia vs. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717; 15 Jur. 967, that the plaintiff cannot
impeach the judgment here on such grounds, and that whilst it
stands unreversed this action cannot be maintained.
The declaration being thus, in our opinion, bad, and the defend-
ants, therefore, entitled to our judgment, it is unnecessary to con-
sider the sufficiency of the pleas.
Judgment for the defendants.
